L'émergence d'un plus large spectre de vulnérabilités (terrorisme, sabotage, conflits locaux et catastrophes naturelles) et l'interdépendance croissante de l'activité économique rendent particulièrement vulnérables les grands réseaux vitaux des pays industrialisés. Pour y faire face, des actions importantes doivent être menées à une échelle nationale, en particulier par le développement de partenariats étroits entre le secteur public et la sphère privée. Cet article analyse l'initiative présidentielle lancée dès 1996 aux Etats-Unis -premier pays au monde à inscrire ces questions à l'agenda du plus haut niveau décisionnel-ainsi que la structure nationale de partenariats mis en place depuis lors. Une telle démarche pourrait constituer un point de départ pour d'autres pays désireux d'élaborer leur propre analyse de vulnérabilités et leur stratégie d'amélioration. Les événements du 11 septembre 2001, comme les attaques à l'anthrax, ont néanmoins montré que les avancées américaines ne constituaient qu'une première étape d'un processus plus global de préparation nationale; les infrastructures critiques des Etats-Unis demeurent hautement vulnérables. Enfin, plusieurs idées fausses, par trop souvent récurrentes, doivent être dépassées pour traiter beaucoup plus efficacement ces risques à grande échelle sur un plan international.
Introduction

"On October 22
nd the center staff began debating […] was the postal system itself contaminated? Should it be down?" (Lipton and Johnson, 2001 ). Crisis at the federal Center for Disease Control (CDC). Shutting down a large-scale network such as the US Postal Service, the officials knew, would inflict debilitating impacts on the economic and social continuity of the country as well as increase stress on the already sensitive psyche of the nation under siege.
Several weeks before, 9/11 terrorists made use of some elements ( The present contribution to the JCCM special issue aims to suggest some ways of possible collective awareness to face emerging crisis situations due to large-scale breakdown or disruption of the critical infrastructures of a country. Developing partnerships between the public sector and the industry at a high decisional level is a key to adapt the organizations' readiness to new sources as well as new scales of possible disruption. In 1996, a first initiative was taken in the US to deal with those emerging large-scale risks. President Clinton launched a national study, which involved both the government (federal executives, state and local authorities) and private industry, to better understand the vulnerabilities of elements of the US infrastructure and key assets that could be critical to the business and social continuity of the country. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative remains unique worldwide as a preventive presidential involvement.
Most European and Asian countries still have paid little attention to those questions at a national level. In light of the 2001 attacks and under current pressure due to the high degree of uncertainty on the international scene, the US initiative may constitute, at least partially, a framework to build up collective intelligence and initiatives to better assess the vulnerabilities of interdependent critical networks and managing them (Michel-Kerjan, 2003 ).
This paper proceeds as follows. After the presentation of some characteristics of emerging threats, the emphasis is put on the necessity to officially clarify the true level As 2001 terrorist attacks dramatically showed, such an initiative constitutes, however, nothing but a first step in a general process to build preparedness at a national level; America still remains vulnerable. I conclude with a few myths we need to confront if we want to efficiently improve our capacity to deal with those new large-scale risks at an international level 2 .
Emerging threats
All terrorist attacks reach a similar goal: creating fear in the targeted country.
Terrorism is of course not a new risk, but the scale as well as the configuration of those attacks was rather different than more traditional terrorist attacks such as car or luggage bombing (Vareilles, 2001) . What do the 9/11 events and the anthrax mailings have in common? The 2001 attacks were not physically directed against specific elements of the infrastructure. By using only four contaminated letters, attackers took great advantage of the vast capacity of the complex network of the US Postal Service 3 . The new aspect is that the network itself served as a tool to diffuse and build a larger scale of threats: every envelop could have been considered as being contaminated, a potential weapon. One of the most useful and common services was becoming a source of dread about biological attacks; everyone was becoming a potential target. That configuration could have been considered only specific to the postal services. Unfortunately, even a short analysis of the dramatic
September 11, 2001 events shows that the method used by terrorists is comparable in a sense that they used few elements (aircraft) of a huge network (civil aviation). As a result, all aircraft were potentially at risk.
It is one of the key lessons of those crises, which translate to a new dimension of potential destabilizations within industries operating those networks. New large-scale vulnerabilities do emerge: our critical networks can be used and reversed against ourselves as weapons for diffusing attacks and alerts throughout a country, all the elements of the network becoming potentially at risk.
At least three characteristics of those new large-scale risks stand out.
A first one is the asymmetric value of the attack: a small-scale but carefully targeted attack can cause large-scale reactions because of strong network interdependencies and possible cascading fallout. For instance, introducing a pathogenic agent into a nationwide distribution network may require small financial investments from attackers compared with the resulting national impact of such an action on the health and business continuity of a country. On 9/11, the terrorists did not use advanced technology to attack the US. By using only box cutters, they hijacked commercial aircraft and crashed them into civilian and government targets.
A second characteristic is the existence of an evolving uncertainty: terrorists can purposefully adopt their strategy of attacks based on their information on vulnerabilities of the systems and choose more vulnerable targets with respect to such information (Michel-Kerjan, 2002) . The fact that attackers can choose numerous different targets implies that a huge number of potential targets need to be protected, which requires significant amount of money.
Uncertainty as to targets as well as the tools that could be used to attack makes the security task very difficult to manage. Ambiguity is a complex component for decision-making. This kind of crisis has little to do with well-known local major events such as local industrial accidents or floods. Here, the stake is to manage large-scale risks using large-scale sets of critical infrastructure being capable of inflicting significant consequences to a whole country.
That requires a national and even international level of answers based upon development of public-private partnerships to deal with those emerging risks.
Putting the "Critical Infrastructures" issue on the agenda 
A new mindset: rethinking national vulnerabilities
Critical infrastructures
What are the "critical infrastructures"? The infrastructure of the United States -as one of the most of industrialized countries-is a complex system of interrelated elements. These elements have become increasingly more concentrated and more interconnected than ever.
Among certain elements of the infrastructure, some are so critical that if they were destroyed or even simply disrupted, an entire region, if not the whole country, could be debilitated.
Critical infrastructures can be defined as "industries, institutions and distribution networks and systems that provide a continual flow of the goods and services essential to a country's defense and economic security and to the health, welfare and safety of its citizens" were affected (banking), as were radio stations and broadcast transmissions (telecommunications). As doctors and other emergency services could not be paged, the country was immediately facing a crisis in emergency communication, highly critical in the healthcare system (vital human services).
The Banking and Finance (banks as well as financial markets) sector and Physical distribution (Airports, Ports, Subways, Highways, Rails, Postal services and shipping) sector also touch everyday life.
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Such a categorization is obviously neither definitive nor exhaustive 5 . However, separating specific sectors helps clarifying the general picture and presents a good framework to deal with the potential vulnerabilities each of them may face 6 . A disruption of any of those networks has immediate paralyzing effects and can produce cascading fallouts over several interdependent operating networks 7 .
Lack of interconnected preparedness
What did the Presidential Commission highlight in its 1997 report? Its 15-month work, which corresponded to a vulnerability recognition phase, showed numerous generic pitfalls in the US infrastructure. Two of them are particularly important for our purpose here.
First, the Commission highlighted a general underestimation of the vulnerabilities themselves.
This is not surprising: in an increasingly competitive world, security (outside of conventional area of responsibility, culture, technical habits) used to be the last thing executives would be eager to spend money on. Many private sector operators considered the administrative and inspection work of regulatory and enforcement officials as making them waste of their time.
Moreover, the high speed and potential ubiquity of incoming attacks were radically off cultural references: on the top-management side, there is still the idea that "you are your boss in your walls", which is actually no longer the fact when attack occurs. And the trend toward decentralization in organizational decision-making exacerbates this tendency.
Second, there was little information sharing between the government and the private sector regarding vulnerability assessment and preparedness programs. There was a lack of global warning system to alert network operators in case of an attack. It was a crucial statement as, it must be stressed, the private sector is the principal provider of goods and services and owner of 85% of the US infrastructure (Gilmore Commission, 2001) . And even governmental functions strongly depend on the reliable operation of privately owned networks. Moreover, information sharing among government components (federal, state, local governments) was 5 In this paper, the expression "critical infrastructures" has to be understood in a general sense; i.e. encompassing physical, cyber and other non-cyber-related critical infrastructures. 6 Each of those sectors and subsectors taken separately is a very complex network. Geographical subnetworks that are also vital networks for the citizens, firms and other organizations living and operating in those areas, which depend on them in that area, compose each of them. So there is high interdependence in these elements of the infrastructure. Second, most of these networks can be greatly interdependent with each other. For instance, the finance sector needs reliable telecommunications, which needs electricity. 7 Quite surprisingly, little academic work has been done in social sciences on the issue of risks due to national interdependency and the most fruitful contributions are just forthcoming (Kunreuther and Heal, in press; Heal and Kunreuther, 2003; Kunreuther, Heal and Orszag, 2002) . Early ideas by Perrow (1984) discussed a similar issue at a local level by analyzing tight and loose coupling tendencies in several domains among which industrial accidents; on more recent concerns after 9/11 events, see Little (2002) .
quite poor at that the time. And, according to the report of the Commission, the situation within companies in the private sector was quite similar (President's Commission, 1997 and infrastructures owners and operators to assess and manage new vulnerabilities from terrorism or malicious acts (physical or cyber attacks)" (PDD 63, White House, 1998) . Such a global framework was recognized as essential to create a dynamic process of risk assessment and risk mitigation (increasing the potentiality that an attack on a critical infrastructure will fail as well as minimizing the disruptive impact of a successful attack). 
The PCIS: a national response, from the industry
As we mentioned above, the largest part of US infrastructure is privately owned.
Because of that, the private sector would be the most exposed to malicious acts against critical networks. Industry responded to the government initiatives by launching the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) in December 1999. The mission of that partnership is precisely to create and develop a cross-industry dialogue and to share experience among the private operators to improve effectiveness and efficiency of individual sector assurance efforts.
The PCIS also coordinates cross-sector initiatives launched by sector coordinators (analogous to the sector liaisons at the federal level) and complements public-private efforts to assure reliable provision of critical services to deal with emerging risks. It has obviously developed close relationships with CIAO for facilitating federal organizations as well as local and statelevel ones to becoming effective partners of the industry. For instance, the CIAO began to hal-00242947, version 1 -6 Feb 2008 forge a broad based partnership between the industry and the government in supporting the PCIS and in launching a nation-wide outreach program targeting senior corporate leaders to make critical network assurance a matter of corporate governance and risk management 10 .
Last but not least, the NIPC has also an access to the President's office through the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC) 11 . That constitutes a strong signal of the importance for the highest level of the country of the private sector's viewpoint and recommendations (Figure 1) .
ISACs: warning centers for critical industries
As a result of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (White House, 1998) 
Scaling the answer to the problem
Through the creation of those entities and by developing awareness at different levels of operation in the government as well as in the private industry, the general architecture of the existing partnerships that have been developed since 1998 responds to a global problem -attacks can be launched everywhere-by a high-level global framework of partnerships. Figure 1 illustrates that global configuration 13 .
America the Vulnerable
With the development of such a global architecture of multi-level partnerships, the United States has been forging for the last 6 years an unprecedented effort of vulnerability recognition as well as the first significant initiatives towards more cooperation throughout federal departments and agencies, state and local governments and the private industry as well. It is, of course, only the beginning of a whole costly and long-term security improvement process. After building up a national framework -the building phase-, it may take a long time to make those partnerships fully operational. Moreover, at lower stages in these partnerships, the operational level has also to understand its role within the new national architecture. The operational phase will not be an easy task. It will require collective engagement as well as time, energy and money.
September 11, 2001 and the anthrax mailings showed the extent to which the US remained unprotected. As pointed out by a recent report by the US General Accounting Office (GAO, 2003) , these facts actually reflect that a nation as large and complex as the US cannot be turned on a dime: America is still vulnerable (Flynn, 2002) . In this section, I outline three problems that seem to be particularly acute for further attention. The first one -the preparedness of local public health systems to manage biological attacks-is currently a key topic of discussion in government administration and is largely relayed by medias. The possibilities of imminent attacks that may result from a US-led war on Iraq increase the general threats. The two other vulnerabilities -security of the water supply system and security of seaports-have been less considered until now.
Chemical and biological attacks: public health systems still unprepared
Are local public health responders and emergency services prepared to deal with biological or chemical attacks? That question is important, as those responders are the front line for ensuring the public's health and safety in case of an attack and also because response to anthrax mailings was not really reassuring on that point. The initial identification of the nature of attacks has actually been really difficult. In particular, while detecting a chemical attack is generally not a problem, detecting a bioattack may be really problematic. Moreover, the poor capacity of authorities in autumn 2001 to organize and coordinate themselves even after anthrax was identified shows the lack of preparedness to deal with those emerging risks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 14 . While one generally assumes that healthcare systems are adequately prepared for terrorism incidents, the reality strongly differs (Barbera, Macintyre, and DeAtley, 2001; Graham, 2002) . National preparation could be a very long and costly process 15 .
The multicountry outbreak of atypical pneumonia referred to as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) might be quite illustrative on that point, as it still remains unexplained. It also showed the potential ubiquity of such phenomena made possible by commercial aviation network. At the beginning of April 2003, nearly 2,500 suspected and/or probable SARS cases -including 89 deaths -have been reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) from 18 countries around the world (WHO, 2003) . That crisis also raised the question of preparedness, as it was the first time in the agency's 55-year history that it has issued a global alert against travel to a specific region or country because of an infectious disease.
Water systems
The water supply is not an infrastructure of interdependent networks over the country:
water systems are in most cases owned and operated by local water companies as well as maintained by local authorities. That local level's involvement in security differs highly from one region to another and is usually slow in adopting new safety technology. Most of those water systems have still not implemented any testing and monitoring capacity of public water supplies for pathogenic contaminants. Even locally, the contamination of such a system would 14 Two years ago, the RAND conducted a nation-wide study to measure the degree of preparedness of local health and emerging services to chemical and biological attacks. Such a study is interesting as it offers a broad overview through two measures: (1) whether the respondent organizations have a plan to address the particular incident and (2) among those with plan, whether the plan has been exercised in the last two years. The studied scenario was not a large-scale attack but a moderately size chemical/biological one (200 injuries). Based on the survey results, plans and exercises are more common for chemical incidents than for biological ones but remain small in both cases. More problematic is the fact that for the biological incident scenario, less than 7 percent of any type of local organizations (police, fire, public health, offices of emergency management, emergency medical services, hospitals) positively answered to the two questions. Moreover, one-quarter of biological incident exercises developed by hospitals and local public health agencies did not test how they would communicate with police, fire and emergency medical services (Fricker, Jacobson and Davis, 2002) . 15 From 1996 to 1999, the Federal government provided WMD response training to 134,000 first responders, only 2 percent of whom received hands-on training with live chemical agents. Moreover, 134,000 fall short of the estimated 9 million first responders to be trained in the US (Council of Foreign Relations, 2002) .
inflict thousands of injuries or even deaths that would be immediately highly publicized as the inability of authorities to provide safely citizens with the basic element of life.
Seaports
As I pointed out earlier in the discussion, on 9/11, the terrorists did not use 
Getting over with myths
On a more general level it is worth noting three recurrent views that strongly limit the development of collective initiatives to deal efficiently with emerging vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures. They are some key issues all countries will have to seriously consider and put as soon as possible on the agenda of the highest executive levels in order to be prepared to manage emerging large-scale risks.
Myth 1. Only the US is vulnerable
9/11 events and anthrax mailings occurred in the US. However, had those events occurred in another industrialized country, the crisis would have been the same or even worse New types of crisis, however, are going to inflict irreversible consequences to the involved organizations, and that faster than ever. Being too optimistic by simply pretending that preparedness is unnecessary is clearly not a viable long-term strategy 17 . Hence, it must be well understood that preparation and collective work on large-scale emerging risks may constitute the unique framework to do a better job in crisis time (Gilbert, 2002; Guilhou and Lagadec, 2002) . Such an anticipative work would even open the door to success as being a clear competitive advantage. The cost of preparation falls short of the significant consequences of emerging risks 18 . And terrorists could learn and adapt their strategies more 16 Cited in Wharton School (2003) . 17 As Norman Augustine made the point few years ago, more than 50% of CEO's have no crisis plan, but 97% are confident that they will respond well if crisis occurs (Augustine, 1995) . 18 The impact of the four 9/11 hijackings is illustrative.
rapidly than some official circles (Rosenthal, Charles, 'T Hart, 1989) . When the attacks occur, time for learning is over 19 .
Myth 3. Building trust is an easy task
Making critical networks safer is a task that involves not only public entities and officials, but private entities and officials as well. The need for public-private partnerships has become necessary for many reasons that are developed above. Creating and developing such partnerships, however, is not an easy task: the habits, cultures, references and attempts of the two sectors differ in numerous ways (Godard, Henry, Lagadec and Michel-Kerjan, 2002) . The integration of the private sector into domestic preparedness programs may take time and create strong opposition because of historical reasons, cost concerns 20 , and legal impediments as well (Kayyem and Chang, 2002) . The alternative -stopping a whole activity-is, conversely, not really attractive. Above all, developing collective initiatives requires being able to trust the other stakeholders. The existence of trust would be an essential element of all enduring and successful public-private partnerships. That aspect of any partnership is a key stake as one of the most fundamental qualities of trust has been known for ages. Trust is fragile (Slovic, 1993 (Slovic, , 1999 Seligman, 2000) . Crisis episodes -perhaps more than any other situations-can destroy it very easily. The problem of Trust is not the least one.
Concluding notes: a collective responsibility
After the recognition by the White House of those issues as critical, after 5 years of vulnerability assessment and creation of multi-level partnerships to mitigate the risk in the United States, the 9/11 terrorists attacks as well as the anthrax mailings revealed cascading impacts due to strong critical infrastructure sector interdependencies, which still often get left out of analyses regarding US critical infrastructure security (Gordon, 2003; GAO, 2003) .
Those events also revealed that the route would be nothing but a very long, complex and costly one.
19 Recent research on anticipation versus improvisation as sources of organization resilience while experiencing an unexpected situation can be fruitful to consider; see for instance Rerup (2001 ), Hatch (1997 , Berliner (1994) . 20 For instance, regarding seaport security, "US-bound cargo ships preparing to leave any foreign port must now file a manifest with US customs inspectors certifying the contents of every container. The new regulation, designed to prevent bombs entering the US in containers, will adds costs, delay shipments, and may result in the shutdown of next day delivery services" (Wharton School, 2003) .
The US initiative may constitute a framework for other countries to develop their own national strategy by adapting it to national particularities. Two elements appear fundamental for succeeding: proactive behavior and challenge. Proactive behavior: do not wait for a series of events before preparing the country and developing new partnerships. Challenge: those risks are nothing but large-scale risks involving whole critical networks; local answers -when they exist and are regularly and efficiently tested-will not be longer sufficient: they have to be part of a national or even international strategy of security improvement.
The European Cooperation on Postal Security closed meeting in Paris last autumn, which was organized in that spirit and that involved top-executives from postal services and authorities from no less than 26 countries 21 , may constitute an initiative to follow.
In the end, the security of critical infrastructures is a matter of collective responsibility -collective courage I would say. With current high tensions on the international scene and as attackers have only to be lucky once, the next two years may be critical.
